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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Dane Murray appeals following the district court's dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. He asserts that the district 
court erred when it dismissed claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
discuss with him his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and advise 
him concerning whether he should waive those rights before he pled guilty and 
participated in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, and for failing to advise 
him that he could obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation before he pled 
guilty and participated in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation. As part of 
Mr. Murray's argument involves a request that this Court overruled the Idaho Court of 
Appeals' decision in Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2011), he respectfully 
requests that this Court retain his case on appeal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the criminal case from which Mr. Murray petitioned for post-conviction relief, he 
entered a plea agreement with the State, assisted by his attorney Jared Martens, under 
the terms of which he agreed to plead guilty to a charge of felony domestic violence 
(amended from a charge of attempted strangulation) in exchange for which the State 
agreed to "cap its recommendation at three plus seven, 120 days Ada County Jail, no 
contact with the victim, need to get a domestic violence and alcohol evaluation," with 
Mr. Murray free to argue for less, including requesting a withheld judgment to which the 
State would not object based on the results of his Presentence Investigation Report 
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(hereinafter, PSI) and related evaluations. As part of the agreement, Mr. Murray was 
required to waive his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006). (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, p.6, L.12 - p.8, L.19.) Mr. Murray pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea 
agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.18, L.19 - p.20, L.20.) 
As required under the terms of his plea agreement, Mr. Murray participated in a 
court-ordered domestic violence evaluation conducted by Tom Wilson. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3.) During the evaluation, Mr. Murray minimized his part in the conduct for which 
he pleaded guilty, denying that he acted with any ill intent. He did not express remorse, 
instead "focus[ing] on the fact that he was attempting to help the victim with unknown 
medical problems." And he "did not acknowledge that he is in need of treatment and is 
not concerned either about his alcohol use or his risk for domestic violence." Partly as a 
result of his statements to the evaluator, Mr. Wilson concluded that Mr. Murray's 
"readiness for treatment is considered minimal," he represented a "medium to high risk 
range for domestic violence," and "he does appear to display several characteristics of . 
. . . [narcissistic personality disorder] that would increase the risk for violence," including 
lacking empathy. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, pp.1-3, 9-12.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a sentence that was in line with 
the plea agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.17.) Mr. Martens 
requested that the district court "follow the agreement .... " (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.30, 
Ls.13-14.) Ultimately, the district court, after discussing the PSI and the domestic 
violence evaluation, including Mr. Murray's statements to Mr. Wilson in which he 
minimized his conduct, declined to follow the parties' recommendation, and imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.31, L.2 -
2 
p.37, L.21.) Mr. Murray did not file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pA.) 
Mr. Murray then filed a timely verified petition for post-conviction relief. In that 
petition, he raised a number of claims, only two of which are being pursued on appeal. 
Those claims are that his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his Estrada 
rights and discuss whether he should waive those rights prior to his guilty plea and 
participation in the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, and failing to advise him 
of his right to obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to deciding 
whether to plead guilty. (R., pp.3-12.) 
Following an evidentiary hearing at which several witnesses, including 
Mr. Murray and Mr. Martens, testified, the district court issued an order dismissing all of 
the claims raised in his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.93-112.) Mr. Murray filed a 
Notice of Appeal timely from the filing of the district court's order dismissing his petition 
for post-conviction relief. (R., p.114.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Murray's petition for post-conviction 
relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Murray's Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Murray asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed claims in his 
verified petition for post-conviction relief that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
discuss with him his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and advise 
him as to whether he should waive those rights before he entered a plea of guilty and 
participated in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, and for failing to advise 
him that he could obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading 
guilty. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Denial Of Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when 
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700 (1999); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing 
mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual 
findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the 
relevant law to those facts. Id. 
2. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
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counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
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Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Murray's Claim Regarding His 
Estrada Rights 
In his verified petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Murray claimed that his 
attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him concerning his rights 
under Estrada and whether to waive those rights prior to entering a plea of guilty and 
participating in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation. The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to 
include the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 688, 685-86 (1984). In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a petitioner must establish that his attorney's actions fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, there 
exists a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Murray testified that, at the time he entered his 
guilty plea, he didn't know what his Estrada rights were, did not ask Mr. Martens what 
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those rights were, and Mr. Martens never discussed Estrada with him. Furthermore, 
Mr. Murray believed that, following his guilty plea, his right to remain silent "was over 
with when I admitted - or pled guilty to the agreeable terms." (Tr., p.18, L.3 - p.19, L.5, 
p.23, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Murray testified that he only participated in the court-ordered 
domestic violence evaluation because he "was ordered [by the court] to do so," and that 
Mr. Martens never gave him any advice with respect to his participation in the 
evaluation. (Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.25, L.4.) Mr. Murray further testified that, although the 
district court mentioned Estrada rights during his plea colloquy, he did not understand 
what the district court was saying, reiterated that Mr. Martens never explained what 
Estrada rights were, and that if he had known he would have ended up in prison in part 
because he waived his Estrada rights he would not have pled guilty. (Tr., p.99, LS.9-
25.) 
Mr. Martens testified that he told Mr. Murray that it would be a "good idea" to 
participate in the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation because "[t]rom prior 
experience, it usually is." When asked whether he failed to "explain to [Mr. Murray] that 
he was waiving his right against self-incrimination as to other information that might 
increase his sentence," Mr. Martens testified, "I may not have. I don't remember. If he 
says I didn't, I will have to take his word on that one." (Tr., p.11 0, L.22 - p.111, L.7.) 
The court-ordered domestic violence evaluation resulted in a report that was 
damaging and detrimental to Mr. Murray's interests. During the evaluation, Mr. Murray 
minimized his part in the conduct for which he pleaded guilty, denying that he acted with 
any ill intent. He did not express remorse, instead "focus[ing] on the fact that he was 
attempting to help the victim with unknown medical problems." And he "did not 
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acknowledge that he is in need of treatment and is not concerned either about his 
alcohol use or his risk for domestic violence." In part as a result of his statements to the 
evaluator, Mr. Wilson concluded that Mr. Murray's "readiness for treatment is 
considered minimal," he represented a "medium to high risk range for domestic 
violence," and "he does appear to display several characteristics of that disorder 
[narcissistic personality disorder] that would increase the risk for violence," including 
lacking empathy. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, pp.1-3, 9-12.) 
In ruling on Mr. Murray's claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
advise him regarding his Estrada rights which prejudiced him by causing him to 
participate in the damaging court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, the district court 
found, "[t]here is no question that the petitioner's counsel did not advise him of his right 
to remain silent at the domestic violence evaluation as required by Estrada v. State, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) nor did he discuss the consequences of waiving that 
right." (R., p.107.) In denying the claim,1 the district court found that his attorney's 
failure to provide advice regarding Estrada did not give rise to a post-conviction claim 
based on the following language from the guilty plea questionnaire2: 
1 Although it did not appear to be a basis for denying Mr. Murray's claim because it was 
not mentioned in the portion of the district court's order applying the facts to the law, 
Mr. Murray notes that the district court made a factual finding "that the petitioner did not, 
in fact, incriminate himself in uncharged criminal matters in the presentence report or 
the evaluation." (R., p.102.) To the extent that the district court could be said to have 
relied upon this factual finding in later dismissing this claim, Mr. Murray cites to Estrada, 
in which the Supreme Court provided an expansive definition of the term incrimination, 
noting that it "is implicated not just when additional charges could be filed, but also 
when punishment could be enhanced as a result of the defendant's statements." 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564 (citations omitted). As such, any reliance on the factual 
finding would be legally untenable. 
2 The guilty plea questionnaire was admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1. (Tr., p.19, 
Ls.16-17.) 
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I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial. 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of 
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under 
State v. Estrada [sic]. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even 
after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any 
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide 
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the 
crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have 
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with 
respect to answering questions or providing information that may increase 
my sentence. 
(R., p.107 (quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p.1).) In reaching its conclusion, the district court 
noted that, in Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2011), 
[T]he Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue and held that, while 
"it is preferable for counsel to advise a defendant of his right to remain 
silent and to discuss the consequences of submitting to the evaluation," 
counsel is not ineffective for failing to re-advise his client after the trial 
court has done so. Since the Court in this case did advise the petitioner of 
his rights under Estrada v. State prior to any participation in a domestic 
violence evaluation or a presentence report, his attorney was not required 
to do so again. 
(R., p.107.) 
Unquestionably, Gonzales stands for the principle cited by the district court. 
However, Mr. Murray maintains that Gonzales was incorrectly decided by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, especially in light of the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Estrada and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Additionally, the facts of Mr. Murray's 
case can be distinguished from those in Gonzales. 
In Wood, the Supreme Court considered whether an attorney in a capital murder 
case provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he consented to the district court's 
order releasing the contents of a then-unwritten psychological report based on a 
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confidential evaluation performed by a psychiatrist retained by the defense. In 
concluding that doing so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court 
explained, "[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist had been appointed by the by the court for 
purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood would have had the 
opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the information and of the 
privilege against self-incrimination." Wood, 132 Idaho at 714 (emphasis added). 
In Estrada, the Supreme Court considered whether an attorney was ineffective 
for failing to advise his client of his right not to incriminate himself by participating in a 
psychosexual evaluation. The questions addressed in Estrada were limited to whether 
Estrada's attorney provided ineffective assistance in failing to advise him of his right to 
assert the privilege against self-incrimination prior to participating in the psychosexual 
evaluation and whether he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance. 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 839. In setting forth basic principles, the Court explained, "[i]t 
makes no sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or 
entry of a guilty plea, and would also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet 
would not be entitled to the advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a 
psychosexual evaluation." Id. at 562. The Court went on to hold that a defendant 
enjoys a Sixth Amendment right "to at least the advice of counsel regarding his 
participation in the psychosexual evaluation .... " Id. at 563. 
A reading of the relevant portions of Wood and Estrada, discussed supra, reveals 
that the effective assistance of counsel to which a person has a Sixth Amendment right 
when deciding whether to participate in an evaluation is two-fold. The first is that 
defense counsel must inform the person of his right against self-incrimination. The 
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second, that went unrecognized by the Court of Appeals in Gonzales, is that defense 
counsel must also provide advice regarding whether to assert that right, including 
consideration of the possible uses of that information. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 714; 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 838-39 ("[N]oting that '[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist had been 
appointed by the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood 
would have had the opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the 
information and of the privilege against self-incrimination."') (emphasis and brackets in 
original) (quoting Wood, 132 Idaho at 714). 
To hold that a district court's statements concerning a defendant's Estrada rights 
are the functional equivalent of an attorney's advice on the subject, as the Court of 
Appeals did in Gonzales and the district court did in this case, makes too little of the 
requirement that defense counsel "advise" a defendant with respect to whether to 
submit to a potentially-incriminating evaluation. As the Court in Estrada explained, 
This Court's finding that a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel 
in the critical stage of a psychosexual evaluation inquiring to a defendant's 
future dangerousness, does not necessarily require the presence of 
counsel during the exam. Because Estrada does not argue his attorney 
should have been present during the evaluation, this ruling is limited to the 
finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding 
only the decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual exam. 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562-63 (first and second emphases in original; third emphasis 
added). Because Mr. Murray enjoyed a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding the 
decision of whether to submit to a domestic violence evaluation, the district court erred 
in concluding that its statements to Mr. Murray on the issue amounted to the equivalent 
of an attorney's advice on the subject. This is particularly true in Mr. Murray's case, as 
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the district court provided incorrect and contradictory information concerning 
Mr. Murray's Estrada rights as is discussed infra. 
Factually, this case is distinguishable from Gonzales. Unlike the facts of 
Gonzales, here the district court provided conflicting statements concerning 
Mr. Murray's Estrada rights, specifically stating in the guilty plea questionnaire that, by 
pleading guilty, Mr. Murray was retaining his Estrada rights (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p.1), 
while, at the plea colloquy, stating, 
And you understand you are giVing up your rights under State versus 
Estrada [sic], and that means that you cannot refuse to answer any 
question or provide any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime? 
You need to talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and 
with any domestic violence evaluator about any problems that you might 
have that might have a bearing upon sentencing. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.) 
Aside from the fact that the two pieces of information provided by the district 
court contradict each other, the latter statement was incorrect. Just because Mr. Murray 
entered a plea agreement containing a term that required him to participate in a 
domestic violence evaluation and waive his Estrada rights does not mean that he could 
not have reasserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at any time 
prior to, or during, the evaluation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) 
(recognizing that a suspect who waives his right against self-incrimination by answering 
some questions or volunteering some information "does not deprive him of the right to 
refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and 
thereafter consents to be questioned"). While it may have constituted a breach of the 
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terms of the plea agreement,3 Mr. Murray could not have irrevocably surrendered his 
right against self-incrimination, a feat that could only have been accomplished through a 
grant of immunity. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 
(1964) (holding that a person cannot be compelled to give incriminating testimony 
unless he is granted immunity from the use of that testimony and its fruits in both state 
and federal prosecutions). 
For the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Murray asserts that the district court erred 
when it dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with 
respect to his decision to submit to a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation. He 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his 
petition on this claim, and remand this matter for entry of judgment in his favor on this 
claim, with the district court to decide which of the requested remedies to employ.4 
D. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Murray's Claim Regarding 
His Right To Obtain A Confidential Domestic Violence Evaluation Prior To 
Pleading Guilty 
In his verified petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Murray claimed that his 
attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to explain that "I had a right to obtain 
my own domestic violence evaluation which would not be released to the Court without 
3 The question that would arise in the event of a finding that Mr. Murray breached the 
plea agreement would be the remedy to which the State was entitled. That is not, 
however, relevant to the question of whether Mr. Murray retained the right to reassert 
his privilege against self-incrimination at any time. 
4 Mr. Murray sought two specific remedies: (1) withdrawal of his guilty plea, or (2) 
resentencing. (R., p.11.) Either remedy is appropriate given the fact that he entered his 
guilty plea without having received advice concerning his Estrada rights and whether to 
assert or waive them. On appeal, Mr. Murray requests that this Court leave it to the 
parties to argue, on remand, as to which remedy is appropriate. 
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my permission," and that he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance 
because "[h]ad I been so informed, I would have obtained my own confidential domestic 
violence evaluation prior to entering a plea of guilty." (R., p.6.) 
At the evidentiary hearing on his petition, Mr. Murray testified consistently with 
the statements in his verified petition, namely, that his attorney never told him that he 
could have obtained his own confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading 
guilty, and that he "probably" would have obtained a confidential evaluation had he 
known he could get one. (Tr., p.23, L.14 - p.24, L.19.) 
Mr. Martens testified that he "sometimes" advises his clients of their right to 
obtain confidential evaluations prior to pleading guilty, but that he did not advise 
Mr. Murray of his right to obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to 
pleading guilty. He further testified that, at the time that Mr. Murray entered his guilty 
plea, he did not know how the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation would turn 
out. However, he did know that Mr. Murray had denied some of the allegations 
contained in the police reports, and believed that he would probably continue with those 
denials during the domestic violence evaluation. (Tr., p.111, L.8 - p.113, L.24.) 
Mr. Martens acknowledged that the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation was 
"unfavorable to Mr. Murray." The evaluation included a conclusion that Mr. Murray was 
a medium-to-high risk for domestic violence, his readiness for treatment was minimal, 
he tends to minimize his current and past behavior, and he doesn't believe he has 
substance abuse or domestic violence problems. (Tr., p.115, L.9 - p.117, L.1.) 
In dismissing this claim, the district court reasoned, 
Counsel at this proceeding has also contended that it was ineffective 
assistance of counsel for trial counsel not to get another domestic violence 
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evaluation either before his plea for use by the defense or before 
sentencing. There was no showing of any benefit from an additional 
evaluation at any stage of the proceedings. It is speculative that an 
additional evaluation would have been of any use. In Gonzales v. State, 
supra., the Court of Appeals held that there was no obligation to obtain a 
confidential defense evaluation to inform the defense decision to 
participate in a court-ordered evaluation and that the failure to do so was 
not ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner has failed to meet his 
burden to show that his counsel was ineffective with respect to additional 
evaluations. 
(R., p.1 08 (failure to italicize supra and use of period after supra in original).) 
Gonzales is easily distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Murray's case. In 
Gonzales, it was argued that defense counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to 
obtain a confidential psychosexual evaluation before advising Gonzales as to whether 
he should participate in a court-ordered evaluation. During the court-ordered 
evaluation, Gonzales disclosed a number of uncharged crimes involving both the victim 
of the lewd conduct charge to which he pleaded guilty (his minor daughter) and two 
other victims. In rejecting this claim, the Court noted, "[c]ounsel's failure to arrange a 
defense evaluation in order to prepare for the possible incriminating outcome of a 
subsequent evaluation does not constitute deficient performance." Gonzales, 151 Idaho 
at 173-74. 
Mr. Murray has put forth a different argument, namely that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to obtain a confidential domestic violence 
evaluation prior to pleading guilty. We know from the unrebutted facts established 
through Mr. Murray's testimony and verified petition that he would have obtained such a 
confidential evaluation had he been aware that he had the right to do so, and he would 
not have pled guilty and submitted to a court-ordered evaluation had he known that 
waiving his Estrada rights could have resulted in a greater sentence. (R., p.6; Tr., p.23, 
16 
L.14 - p.24, L.19.) Considering the damaging nature of the domestic violence 
evaluation in this case, including its conclusions that Mr. Murray minimized his 
culpability, was minimally ready for treatment, and did not believe that he had substance 
abuse and domestic violence problems, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Murray 
would not have pled guilty and agreed to a non-confidential domestic violence 
evaluation had he known ahead of time that his evaluation would be so unfavorable. 
Furthermore, in Gonzales the petitioner was aware of his ability to obtain an 
independent psychosexual evaluation, as his attorney informed the court that he would 
obtain such an evaluation in addition to the court-ordered evaluation at the time it was 
ordered.S Id. The failure to advise Mr. Murray of his right to obtain a confidential 
evaluation and ensure that he receive one prior to deciding to plead guilty represented 
deficient performance, and prejudiced Mr. Murray by causing him to plead guilty in what 
did not represent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice. 
For the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Murray asserts that the district court erred 
when it dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with 
respect to his attorney's failure to advise him of his right to obtain a confidential 
domestic violence evaluation prior to deciding whether to plead guilty and submit to a 
court-ordered domestic violence evaluation. He respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's order dismissing his petition on this claim, and remand this 
matter for entry of judgment in his favor on this claim, with the district court to decide 
which of the requested remedies to employ.6 
5 Inexplicably, a separate defense evaluation was not conducted. Id. at 173. 
6 See nA, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Murray respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
dismissing the claims from his petition for post-conviction relief discussed herein, and 
remand this matter for entry of judgment in his favor on both claims. 
DATED this 9th day of August, 2012. 
SPENCEH J. HAHN 
Depl.1ty~State Appellate Public Defender 
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